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TO BEDLAM AND PART WAY BACK: 
JOHN RAWLS AND CHRISTIAN JUSTICE 
Timothy P. Jackson 
The diversity of human wants, needs, actions, passions, and opinions within 
a pluralistic society is undeniable. Given such diversity, the classical defini-
tion of justice as "to each his or her due" does not readily translate into 
material principles for the distribution of social benefits and burdens. Indeed, 
a theory of justice suited to liberal democracies may seem an impossible 
ideal. In this paper, I examine John Rawls's attempt to formulate such a theory 
despite the odds. I highlight the evolution of his views over the last twenty 
years-a course I characterize as "to Bedlam and part way back"-but 
conclude that these views are not a fit candidate for Christian affirmation. 
It's better, I think, to embrace what I call "the priority of agape to political 
philosophy. " 
"Justice (fairness) originates among those who are approximately equally 
powerful, as Thucydides ... comprehended correctly ....... justice is repayment 
and exchange on the assumption of an approximately equal power position .... 
Justice naturally derives from prudent concern with self-preservation; that 
means, from the egoism of the consideration: 'Why should I harm myself 
uselessly and perhaps not attain my goal anyway?'" [Nietzsche, Human, 
All-Too-Human, 92, appearing in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, tr. by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), p. 148.] 
"The Gospel makes no distinction between the love of our neighbor and 
justice. . .. The supernatural virtue of justice consists of behaving exactly as 
though there were equality when one is the stronger in an unequal relation-
ship" [Simone Weil, Waiting for God, tr. by Emma Craufurd (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 139, 143.] 
"Owe no one anything, except to love one another; for he who loves his 
neighbor has fulfilled the law" [Saint Paul, Romans 13:8.] 
Introduction 
The contemporary secular philosopher most often thought to be congenial 
to a Christian conception of justice is John Rawls. In this examination of 
Rawls's work, however, I shall contend that a Christian affirmation of his 
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"justice as fairness" is impossible. My overall thesis will be fairly simple: to 
appropriate Rawlsian motifs for the elaboration of Christian justice is to be, 
in Anne Sexton's phrase, "torn down from glory daily." I choose Rawls, need 
I say, not because he is ready fodder for Christian social ethics but because 
he is a most articulate champion of liberal political thought. Indeed, to trace 
the trajectory of his writing is to plot the instructive course of the greatest 
living American political philosopher-a course "to Bedlam and part way 
back," to quote another title from Sexton. l 
Sexton's title is, for my purposes, more than just a euphonic conceit. "Bedlam" 
was a Medieval name for the town of Bethlehem in Judea, according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, as well as a name applied to the Hospital of St. 
Mary of Bethlehem in London. The latter was "founded as a priory in 1247, 
with the special duty of receiving and entertaining the bishop of St. Mary of 
Bethlehem [et al.] ... as often as they might come to England." As early as 
1330, however, the original priory was described as "an hospital"; upon the 
Dissolution of the Monasteries, it was granted to the mayor and citizens of 
London; by 1402 it was chatacterized as a hospital for lunatics; and by 1547 
it was incorporated as "a royal foundation for the reception of lunatics. "2 The 
evolution of a Christian priory, designed to receive a bishop into a secular 
foundation, designed to receive lunatics, is emblematic of the complex rela-
tion between Christianity and contemporary political praxis. Similarly, the 
translation of a name referring to the birthplace of Jesus into a name synon-
ymous with insane confusion is suggestive for current political theory, in-
cluding Rawls's. 
Rawls, like other liberal theorists, attempts to take a commitment to justice, 
freedom, and equality originally at home in a religious community (the Judeo-
Christian) and either incorporate it into or read it out of a secular framework 
free of any substantive conception of the self and its virtues. Yet, seeing that 
this is impossible-for are not the people in his "original position" close to 
lunatics?-Rawls then retreats to endorse a vision of the person that is 
thought to command wide agreement (an "overlapping consensus"). It is in 
this sense that his intellectual course is "to Bedlam and part way back." 
I say "part way," because what Rawls calls "the fact of pluralism" still 
keeps him from straightforwardly defending a particular teleological anthro-
pology as true, whether commonly held or not. Having eschewed a dominant 
end, however, his defense of liberal social arrangements is on the basis of personal 
and political goods that are anything but neutral. In the end, consensus alone 
does not give him the requisite critical purchase for a moral theory. 
1. To Bedlam: Justice as Fairness, 1971-1985 
Although already minimalist, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) still 
supports its conception of justice as fairness with a morally significant on-
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tology. Its Kantian commitment to the freedom and equality of persons in the 
original position is at least partially founded on a perception of attributes 
intrinsic to human nature. Rawls explicitly endorses seeing the people behind 
the veil of ignorance as akin to Kantian noumenal selves, capable of choice 
and possessing a sense of justice as well as a "thin" conception of the good 
for human beings as such.3 They are ignorant of their particular beliefs and 
specific places in society, but their social contract is premised on general 
truth claims and thus not morally empty. The "basis of equality" is the "nat-
ural attributes" of "moral persons" (the capacity for a rational life-plan and 
for a desire to act upon principles of right); and, as Rawls emphasizes: 
"Equality is supported by the general facts of nature and not merely by a 
procedural rule without substantive force. "4 The rules of the justice game are 
decided voluntaristically (on the basis of rationally self-interested choices), 
if you will, but membership among the players is decided ontologically (on 
the basis of who people are prior to choosing). 
It is debatable whether Rawls succeeds, in the 1971 volume, in justifying 
a unique set of principles of justice via such a minimalist scenario.s In later 
work, however, he takes an increasingly pragmatic turn that renders earlier 
controversies along this line beside the point. In his Dewey Lectures (1980), 
for example, Rawls accents the senses in which his principles of justice are 
"constructed" and thus do not follow from antecedent moral rules nor corre-
spond to external moral facts. One begins to wonder, at Rawls's own invita-
tion, whether his project has anything at all to do with moral or epistemic 
justification. Still, even in the 1980 essays, he conceives of model persons 
as "free and equal," and it is because of this "part of the truth" that they are 
"worthy" to participate in the social contract.6 So at least in places Rawls 
remains "open" here to truth claims at the level of human nature and has not 
denied the relevance of objective (moral) truths to a theory of justice.7 He 
has not yet merely collapsed theory into practice. 
Rawls's 1981 Tanner Lectures begin on a promising note for anyone trou-
bled by the constructivist (occasionally Hobbesian) diction of the Dewey 
Lectures. In the first paragraph, Rawls contends that "the basic liberties and 
their priority rest on a conception of the person that would be recognized as 
liberal and not ... on considerations of rational interests alone."s He goes on 
to construe the "two moral powers" of a sense of right and justice and the 
capacity for a conception of the good as "the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for being counted a full and equal member of society in questions of 
political justice."9 So far so good. Yet towards the end of the lectures we are 
told that "[t]he essential point here is that the conception of citizens as free 
and equal persons is not required in a well-ordered society as a personal or 
associational or moral idea .... Rather it is a political conception affirmed for 
the sake of establishing an effective public conception of justice. "10 The 
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ultimate reason for endorsing the freedom and equality of persons seems 
troublingly expedient: to facilitate public cooperation. 
The assumption of freedom and equality cannot be called a noble lie, since 
at this juncture Rawls appears unwilling to commit to either its truth or its 
falsity, but it is something like an instrumental hypothesis the justification 
for which is not its plausibility but its practicality. Willing cooperation is not 
sensible because people are in fact free and equal, rather people are consid-
ered free and equal in order to secure such cooperation. 
Whatever the ambiguities of his Dewey and Tanner offerings, by the time 
of "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical" (1985), the theoretical 
jig is up for Rawls. He assures us early on in this work that "a political 
conception of justice is, of course, a moral conception;"1l but he goes on to 
claim that his work "presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, 
but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement 
between citizens viewed as free and equal persons."12 The problem is that, 
for theoretical purposes, Rawls rules out citizens' agreeing to just political 
arrangements because they actually believe one another to be free and equal; 
thus, in fact, he evacuates justice as fairness of any recognizably moral 
motivation. Reliance on social contract theory supported by a "thin" concep-
tion of the good, already vague and arguably unworkable in 1971, now gives 
way (despite protests) to something very like "Hobbesian" conventionalism. 
Hence Rawls completes in this piece the shift to postmodernism, the migra-
tion from what I would call1iberalism-as-morally-basic to liberalism-as-mor-
ally-empty. It is a transition from looking for fundamental moral truths about 
which rational people might agree (a version of what used to be called "nat-
ural justice") to giving up on moral truth claims altogether in favor of a 
radical pragmatism, at least in the political sphere. To be sure, Rawls nowhere 
argues that religious or moral truth claims are false or unimportant as such-
quite the contrary-but in this article he does systematically exclude them as 
(at best) unnecessary to his theory of justice. 
Evidently, there is considerable distance not only between Athens and Je-
rusalem but also between Athens and Cambridge. May we even speak of a 
"conflict" between premodern theological accounts of justice and postmodern 
philosophical ones, or has our era merely changed the subject, as Richard 
Rorty maintains?13 Response to these questions depends largely upon which 
of two strands of the Enlightenment one takes as more persuasive and (per-
haps) which of two strands of Christianity one takes as more faithful. The 
first Enlightenment strand ("liberalism-as-morally-basic") founds the case for 
democratic equality and cultural pluralism on fundamental truths about 
human nature and moral obligation, i.e., on a substantive conception of the 
good. Liberal conceptions of justice must here be validated by a standard 
higher than majority opinion or corporate self-interest, even if lower than the 
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fully articulated worIdview of anyone moral-cultural tradition. The second 
Enlightenment strand ("liberalism-as-morally-empty"), fearing the theoreti-
cal and/or practical implications of the first option, goes radically minimalist 
and seeks at most to be neutral on the question of the good, relying instead 
on such nonmoral notions as self-interest and social contract. The argument 
runs thus: If we start talking about "eternal truths," "the will of God," "the 
good of man," or even "prudence" (in Saint Thomas's vs. Thomas Hobbes's 
sense), we will end up bashing each other's heads in; so we must embrace 
historicism and speak of "justice" in terms only of consensus and convention. 14 
To the extent that liberalism-as-morally-basic offers a substantive concep-
tion of the good entailing the equal worth of persons, it is the secularization 
of a theme recognizable in both major strands of Western Christian theology 
(the Thomistic and the Reformed). To the extent that liberalism-as-morally-
empty seeks to be neutral concerning conceptions of the good, it becomes, I 
believe, an impossible theory. It seeks to ground social ethics on the amoral, 
which is dubious enough; but, more concretely, its minimalism makes it 
incapable of the neutral specification of the structures of justice it aspires to. 
In the case of Rawls, as I hope to show, any number of conflicting and even 
tyrannical positions are compatible with justice as fairness; and in the end 
his political minimalism becomes morally unsupportable. 15 
The unsuitability, for Christian purposes, of a purely political justice as 
fairness can be adumbrated by contrasting the Bible's account of the creation 
and fall of Adam and Eve with John Rawls's depiction of the original position 
and veil of ignorance. Whether or not the Biblical passages may be taken as 
historically informative, Rawls's scenario is clearly a thought experiment 
only. But even so, both the ancient and the postmodern accounts can be 
evaluated as akin to myths of origin. They are meant, like all etiologies, to 
clarify our self-understanding by telling a (quasi-causal) story of how we 
might have gotten to where we are. For its part, the Book of Genesis begins 
with an act of divine kenosis in which humanity's being created in God's 
image makes covenant relations between people both possible and mandatory. 
Out of the hand of God, human beings are disposed to mutual trust and 
understanding: cooperation comes before reflection. The subsequent refusal 
or disordering of personal relations is incompatible with humanity as created 
and is characterized morally as a fall that leads to the loss of original com-
munity. The 1985 Rawls's picture is by design, of course, almost exactly the 
reverse. Rather than beginning with ontological commitments to the finite 
dignity of men and women, as well as to their interrelatedness-the tie that 
binds at least some Thomist and Reformed Christians-the individuals in 
Rawls's original position are stripped of any potentially true (much less thick) 
conception of their own worth or of the good life together. And rather than 
moral revelation encouraging personal solidarity, the veil of ignorance must 
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be used to induce them to agree to abstract social principles. Political coop-
eration is artificial in this sense, the result of human kenosis. 
We are not to think of the original position as containing literal people 
trying to decide whether to concern themselves with the interests of others. 
Again, Rawls is engaged in a thought experiment, and, in any case, the 
motivation operative in the original position is not meant to model in any 
rigorous way the real motivation of individuals in liberal democracies. Still, 
the key question remains: why should either we or the Rawlsian original 
posits/parents agree to take the veil, even in mente? The veil of ignorance is 
a vehicle to get (hypothetical) people to agree on specific principles of justice, 
when in fact only an antecedent and highly developed appreciation of virtue 
would move them to go behind the veil in the first place. In the Tanner 
Lectures, Rawls specifies that a sense of justice undergirds individuals' abil-
ity to honor fair terms of social cooperation and that this sense (what he calls 
"the Reasonable") is expressed in the restrictions on agreement in the original 
position. What he calls "the Rational," on the other hand, refers to each 
person's rational advantage, to whatever concrete good they are trying to 
advance in society. Crucially, Rawls thinks that the sense of justice is shared, 
at least among liberals, but that conceptions of rational advantage generally 
differ and may even be incommensurable. 16 
My point, however, is that one cannot make sense of the Reasonable as 
embodied in a common sense of justice independently of the Rational as a 
determinate conception of the source and nature of human goodness. Accep-
tance of the fair terms of social cooperation, if it is to be moral, itself depends 
on a conception of the good life for humanity. Our rules of fair conduct are 
not separable from who we think we are and vice versa, as is suggested by 
our treatment of plants, animals, and even fetuses. I? 
Rawls's optimism about universal acceptance of fair terms for public in-
teraction, and thus of the constraints on the original position, is tied to his 
conviction that "[s]ocial cooperation is always for mutual benefit."18 But it 
makes all the difference how this idea is interpreted. If mutual benefit moti-
vates any given individual to accept the constraints on self-interest of the 
original position, then the question becomes: Why should he or she agree to 
let all others in as well? Why not contract only with those whose cooperation 
will further key desires? Even though mutual benefit implies for Rawls some-
thing more than crude self-interest, what are we to make of those (such as Saint 
Paul) whose determinate conception of the good rules out (or at least greatly 
subordinates) mutual benefit as a basis for community or motive for action? 
The fact that, in the absence of prior community, inclusiveness cannot 
survive even one generation is a Biblical lesson lost to the political Rawls. 
Without a thick appreciation of his good, Cain cannot suffer even his brother 
Abel (much less an enemy) to live. The question "Am I my brother's keeper?" 
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is, for Rawls, an invitation to liberal political philosophy; but for Christian 
theology, the question itself is a mark of sin. Any Christian perspective on 
justice that would be credible, not to mention prophetic, must begin and end 
with this realization. Thus any philosophical perspective which renders the 
realization impossible cannot be affirmed. 
II. Which Bedlam'? Tho Sympathetic Readings Rebutted 
In a recent two-part essay, Harlan Beckley argues that "the distinctively 
Christian moral ideal of love obligates those who adhere to it to embrace the 
beliefs which undergird John Rawls's idea of justice as fairness. They are 
thereby obligated to accept something like Rawls's original position as a 
perspective for justifying principles of justice. "19 He hastens to add that this 
strong affirmation holds only for the issue of distributive justice and not 
necessarily for the whole of social ethics; but within these confines Beckley 
believes that Rawls's contract theory "founds the justification for a concep-
tion of justice upon general moral beliefs which can be shared by those who 
hold partially conflicting particular beliefs and moralities. "20 
Beckley is convinced that Rawls can answer the criticism that justice as 
fairness is unable to provide the contractors with credible reasons for entering 
the original position. On Beckley's view, Rawls does not simply charge with 
irrationalism those who reject the veil of ignorance, nor does he propose to 
impose the original position on those who have divergent personal beliefs. 
Instead, Rawls's case for the restrictions of the original position depends upon 
its plausibility to diverse thinkers in reflective equilibrium, "upon continuity 
between the restrictions and the beliefs persons actually hold after due re-
flection. "21 In short, Rawls recognizes that for his theory to be credible it 
must move individuals (including Christians) to bracket their distinctive 
moral and religious beliefs (including their fully articulated accounts of jus-
tice) in a way consonant with at least most of those beliefs themselves. And, 
according to Beckley, this is exactly what Rawls succeeds in doing. 
I want to argue, to the contrary, that a commitment to Christian love pos-
itively rules out acceptance of Rawls's theory, at least as elaborated through 
1985. Beckley's essay was written prior to the publication of "Justice as 
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical," so criticism of his failure to appreciate 
the radicality of Rawls's "middle" period must be somewhat muted; but, as 
I have indicated, the pragmatic themes that make a Christian affirmation 
impossible were already evident in his 1980 article, "Kantian Constructivism 
in Moral Theory." And if one allows the 1985 piece to govern retroactively 
the reading of Rawls's prior corpus, as he seems to wish, then even A Theory 
of Justice is beyond Christian ecumenics. In any event, my chief point is that 
a sympathetic reading of Rawls requires that Christians discount a substantial 
portion of his authorship. It is only by misconstruing the political Rawls's 
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claims to impartiality that justice as fairness can seem a candidate for Chris-
tian endorsement. 
Let me proceed by summarizing once more, and as positively as possible, 
the general contours of justice as fairness as traced in Rawls's late middle 
period (1980-85). For this Rawls, reasonableness underdetermines morality. 
He explicitly grants that there is much more to the good life than prudence 
narrowly defined as self-interest, and nothing about the original position is 
intended to endorse egoism or to deny altruism. Conversely, however, in 
Rawls's estimation the concrete moral traditions that attempt to define the 
good life in detail overdetermine principles of distributive justice. To dictate 
social arrangements on the basis of a single metaphysical school would be to 
impose on others more than reason can justify. Because reasonable people 
can disagree on the nature of morality (Le., on what more than self-interest 
is required for living well), it would be tyrannical to compel everyone to 
accept a particular moral theory. Hence Rawls attempts to generate acceptable 
principles of justice by putting external constraints on the contractors in his 
original position, such as the veil of ignorance. He attempts to rule out egoism 
and tyranny without having to appeal to controversial moral doctrines, and 
this necessitates relying on (1) a common but largely premoral interest in 
public peace and (2) a reasonable but largely undefended picture of persons 
as free and equa}.22 
There is an odd circularity in this scheme, however. On the one hand, 
entrance into the original position and acceptance of the restrictions it entails 
must be agreed to by individuals fully aware of their moral beliefs and 
particular interests, or else they have no persuasive reason to take the veil 
and are merely compelled to endorse justice as fairness. On the other hand, 
if individuals can agree on the relevant restrictions from their fully moral 
perspectives, it makes little sense to think that an external constraint like 
ignorance is subsequently required for choices to be fair. Of course, such 
shifting back and forth between thick and thin conceptions of morality in 
order to arrive at a stable view of justice is part of what Rawls means by 
reflective equilibrium.23 But the issue is whether this idea can be profitably 
(or even intelligibly) fleshed out. 
The problem is that if one's thick conception of the good can move one on 
reflection to take the veil, then there is in fact little reason to take it. Or, to 
grasp the other hom of the dilemma, if our actual values and ends must move 
us to bracket these same aspects of ourselves in the name of fairness, then 
our set of moral beliefs is in fact contradictory. We must surrender in the 
name of fairness the very sensibilities that allow us to judge fairness in the 
first place. If, in the face of this dilemma, one interprets Rawls as relying 
solely on a thin conception of the good (e.g., mutual benefit) to warrant 
acceptance of the restrictions of the original position, then our actual beliefs 
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and values come off looking like mere prejudices or superstitions. They play 
no positive part in the decision to take the veil and in all likelihood stand as 
stumbling blocks to fairness. In this latter case, de facto moral traditions do 
not simply overdetermine principles of justice, they undermine them; thus 
the challenge of a liberal theory of justice is to disabuse people of any thick 
moral belief system that outstrips self-interest and/or cooperation for mutual 
benefit. This is a far cry from the moral neutrality that Rawls sometimes 
claims for his theory, but his work in the early to mid-1980's reflects this 
pragmatic spirit. 
In this period, justice as fairness is dubbed "political not metaphysical," as 
I have noted; but in light of such terminology it becomes all but impossible 
(pace protests) to construe Rawlsian justice as anything other than amoral 
self-interest (prudence in the narrow sense), however restricted by the exi-
gencies of preserving civic harmony. The decisive move comes in denying, 
for purposes of political theory, any truth value to normative anthropology. 
Rather than simply acknowledging multiple rational construals of the impli-
cations of such anthropology, Rawls goes conventionalist. He premises his 
theory of justice on the assumption that persons are free and equal, not 
because this assumption is believed (much less shown) to be correct but 
because it is culturally dominant and practically desirable. The seemingly 
innocuous thesis that "the fair terms of social cooperation are conceived as 
agreed to by those engaged in it"24 is anything but. For agreement premised 
on regnant models of the person-models that can be justified on no other 
basis than that they are regnant-has by 1985 become constitutive, rather 
than symptomatic, of fairness. With this, Rawls can no longer claim to be 
articulating a common moral vision, if only the lowest common denominator 
across a range of equally rational positions. Even the lowest common denom-
inator view (what I earlier called liberalism-as-morally-basic) requires an 
epistemic justification from within various traditions to be plausible as a 
moral theory. To be sure, Rawls nowhere repudiates the belief that persons 
are free and equal, but he can neither defend nor even endorse it and remain 
faithful to his putatively neutral method. 25 What the purely political Rawls 
calls "overlapping consensus"26 is not enough. 
That at this point in his career Rawls has moved from fallibilism about the 
good life, and the pluralism it inspires, to political conventionalism is indi-
cated by more than the absence of an epistemic justification for his theory 
of justice. In 1985, Rawls sees justice as fairness to rule out any such justi-
fication even in principle. (If internal justification were possible it would not 
be necessary to bracket thick moral beliefs.) In other words, he does not 
merely refrain from asserting moral truths: his "theory" categorically rules 
this out with respect to distributive justice. This is more than an acknowl-
edgement of political fallibility; it is not merely an application of the principle 
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of tolerance to philosophy itself, as Rawls suggests in his "Political Not 
Metaphysical" piece;27 it is rather the death of theoria, construed as one 
distinctive means of arriving at truth. It is not that reality is too rich and 
variegated to be captured by discursive reasoning (alone), requiring instead 
(or in addition) something like religious faith. Such a position would repre-
sent the kind of transcendence of theory arguably ascribable to Biblical Chris-
tianity. Rawls here intentionally falls below the demands of classical theory. 
Harlan Beckley reminds us that the original position portrays only a partial 
conception of the moral life (including selfhood), but even this incomplete 
picture depicts the truth of substantive moralities as irrelevant to justice and 
thus is not metaphysically neutral. Beckley contends that "the only reason 
we would 'give up' our particular conception of the good for the purpose of 
formulating principles of justice is because the restrictions of the original 
position seem reasonable and assist us, after reflection, in correcting or af-
firming the judgments we already hold."28 But then why not rather say that 
we are working out the implications of our particular beliefs and values rather 
than bracketing or annulling them with hypothetical ignorance? If our partic-
ular conceptions of the good lead us to agree to the restrictions of the original 
position, and the original position leads us in turn to agree to Rawls's two 
principles of justice, then in fact the principles are based on a particular 
conception of the good, if only at one remove.29 There may be some adjust-
ment, to be sure, but if agreeing to the original position actually requires us 
to see the truth or falsity of our thick moral beliefs as irrelevant to the issue 
of social justice, then moral realists at any rate face something more like 
logical inconsistency than reflective equilibrium. 
Rawls's political minimalism is motivated by respect for diversity of opin-
ion and by the unwillingness to endorse a dogmatic or monolithic conception 
of the good life, but such respect is given no coherent basis. It is, in fact, 
undermined by the refusal to base justice as fairness on moral truth claims, 
however admittedly fallible. Rawls writes: 
One of the deepest distinctions between political conceptions of justice is 
between those that allow for a plurality of opposing and even incommensu-
rable conceptions of the good and those that hold that there is but one con-
ception of the good which is to be recognized by all persons so far as they 
are fully rationapo 
He goes on to claim that Plato and Aristotle, as weB as Augustine and 
Aquinas, "fall on the side of the one rational good,"3l but this is potentially 
misleading. 
It is quite consistent both to think that there is a primary moral telos to 
human nature and to endorse a tolerant social arrangement. The tolerance 
may stem from one or more of three sources: (I) an ontological nuance which 
sees, with Elizabeth Anscombe, that moral reality is a range, with various 
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traditions grasping various parts better than others, (2) an epistemic humility 
which acknowledges, with John Stuart Mill, that we cannot be certain we are 
correct even in our limited account of the good life, and (3) a substantive 
truth claim about the good life itself and the importance of everyone's arriv-
ing at practical conclusions via uncoerced conscience. (For most liberals, in 
fact, the third source is dominant: it is enough to warrant tolerance that a 
thick conception of the good life be felt or believed to be wrong.) In short, 
the Rational cannot be subordinated to (much less divorced from) the Rea:" 
sonable, since fair terms of cooperation become morally compelling only in 
light of a more or less fully worked out moral worldview. Christian °agapists, 
for example, believe that God is just and loving-indeed, that God is jus-
tice-andfor this very reason respect the consciences of all His creatures. 
Rawls's thought experiment through 1985 can be seen as suspect, even as 
a heuristic device, when we realize the following. No one in the original 
position would be moved by its restrictions to see (much less treat) others as 
free, rational, and equal; self-interest and/or the desire to cooperate does not 
require such universalism, as the sovereign in Hobbes's social contract illus-
trates. And even if (per impossibiJe) seeing people in this way did always 
serve our pragmatic aims, to be motivated by this fact would clearly be 
antithetical to Christian ethics rather than morally neutral. If, what is truer to 
the texts, the liberal assumptions about others (what Rawls calls a "sense of 
justice") are imported into the original position and seen even to motivate its 
acceptance, then the original position itself loses much of its point. Beyond 
this, however, the whole scheme collapses for Christian purposes when (es-
pecially in the middle essays) it requires us to embrace the assumption of 
freedom, rationality, and equality not because it is believed true but because 
it is the prevalent "model" in our society and because embracing such a model 
serves our practical purposes.32 Such "liberal" relativism is Christianity's last 
temptation. And, to quote T. S. Eliot, "The last temptation is the greatest 
treason: to do the right deed for the wrong reason. "33 
To be sure, there are formal affinities between Rawls's maximin principle 
of structuring inequalities so as to be of the greatest benefit to the least well 
off, on the one hand, and what some (usually Catholic) moral theologians 
call "a preferential option for the poor," on the other. But the Biblical theme 
of God's solidarity with the disenfranchised and the correlative injunction to 
minister to them cannot be separated from motive. Despite his telling critique 
of utilitarian social theory, Rawls's contractarianism systematically subverts 
ethical motivation. Deontology, one must say, is not enough even politically; 
aretology, or the understanding of personal virtue, is a sine qua non. 
If one would support the thesis that Christian love dictates a commitment 
to freedom and equality, as surely it does in some form, then moral argument 
involving metaphysical and anthropological truth claims is indispensable. 
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One will naturally want to couch these claims in terms commanding the 
widest possible agreement, but the fact that Christians would agree not to 
force (or even to obligate) others to act on Christian principles does not mean 
that Christians themselves must act from unChristian principles. The critical 
distinction is between what is morally basic and shared by many traditions 
and what is so morally thin as actually to rule out appeal to any moral 
traditions at all. No credible theory of justice can call for us to saw off the 
branch on which we are sitting. 
Finally, in spite of Beckley's protests, Christians could not accept Rawls's 
1985 views even if they were presented as truth claims, because Christians 
believe they are bound to promote their neighbors' interests further than any 
consent to principles of justice flowing from social contract or mutual benefit. 
It is not the hypothesis of contract but the reality of the kingdom that grounds 
the treatment of believer and nonbeliever alike. Reasonable self-interest does 
not merely underdetermine Christian ethics, if given motivational priority it 
is antithetical to Christianity's radical universal demand for self-sacrificial 
love. 
In contrast to the objection just lodged, Beckley argues that 
Rawls requires bracketing our conception of the good only for purposes of 
agreeing to a conception of justice. In all other moral matters, Christians are 
'free' to be 'bound' by their distinctive commitments .... Refusing to make 
these revisions for purposes of arriving at a common conception of justice is 
to claim that Christians are not free to accept principles of justice that respect 
the freedom to hold other than Christian beliefs.34 
But this misses the key point about intention: a commitment to justice that 
is not motivated by love (or at least something considerably thicker than 
self-interest or public cooperation) is arguably not a moral commitment at all 
for Christians. It simply is not the case, as Beckley claims, that Rawls's 
contract theory resolves "the dilemma of Christians attempting to arrive at a 
conception of justice which respects the liberty of nonbelievers without being 
unfaithful to Christian beliefs. "35 Christians would surely want to extol prin-
ciples of justice that respect others' freedom of conscience; but if this is not 
motivated by a love of neighbor (and of God), then it is almost certainly 
idolatrous. Christians will want to respect nonagapists, for example, but pre-
cisely because they love them agapically. If Rawls requires that "respect" 
spring from something other than love, that "tolerance" grow out of the 
"reasonable" quest for mutual benefit or a mere "model" of persons as free 
and equal, then these can be but glittering vices to Christians. 
I grant that the exegesis of Rawls is difficult on this point, but this is 
because he (and Beckley) want it both ways, as will become still more ap-
parent in my section III. They indicate at times that Christians may "reason 
within" their tradition in accepting the views on freedom, reason, and equality 
TO BEDLAM AND PART WAY BACK 435 
evident in the original position, but they also enjoin Christians to "abstract 
from" their concrete, moral notions (including agape) in order to be suitably 
thin and publicly persuasive. Is this a prescription for eqUilibrium or for 
schizophrenia? Beckley simultaneously claims, e.g., that (1) "[t]he strongest 
ground for a Christian affirmation of justice as fairness is the direct support 
love as equal regard provides for Rawls's belief in the equality of persons" 
and (2) "for purposes of formulating principles of justice, agapists will accept 
restrictions which prohibit them from basing principles upon their distinctive 
beliefs, including love. "36 His considered opinion seems to be that "[l]ove 
affirms but does not replace Rawls's idea of justice as fairness";37 but, again, 
if Christians allow contract theory to be their justifying and motivating factor, 
then they have been unfaithful to their religious beliefs. Caesar has been 
rendered more than is rightfully his, and on his own terms-the terms of 
secular Bedlam. 
A second "sympathetic reading" of Rawls is provided by Richard Rorty, 
particularly in an essay entitled "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy." 
Rorty's reading is distinctive for its extrapolating and extolling the very 
elements in Rawls that make Beckley's affirmation of him problematic. For 
Rorty, Rawls's "Political Not Metaphysical" article does not represent the 
theory of justice gone to smash but its coming to increasing pragmatic self-
consciousness. If previously it seemed that Rawls was vacillating between 
several polar opposites-metaphysics/politics, natural justice/practical con-
vention, self-interested individualism/cooperative communitarianism, theo-
retical neutrality/historicist anti-universalism, in short, Kant/Hegel-by 1985 
the ambiguity was resolved in favor of Hegel, or at least along "quasi-Hegel-
ian" Deweyan lines.38 These lines represent a break not just with Christian 
theology but also with Enlightenment philosophy. Rorty argues that "Rawls, 
following up on Dewey, shows us how liberal democracy can get along 
without philosophical presuppositions."39 Rawls should be thought of as say-
ing that 
[f]or purposes of social theory, we can put aside such topics as an ahistorical 
human nature, the nature of selfhood, the motive of moral behavior, and the 
meaning of human life. We treat these as as irrelevant to politics as Jefferson 
thought questions about the Trinity and about Transubstantiation.40 
Rawls helps us see that we need only rely on "the tradition of a particular 
community, the consensus of a particular culture,"41 rather than on truth 
claims about an independent metaphysical and moral order, let alone God. 
As Rorty puts it, "[t]ruth about the existence or nature of that order drops out 
[for Rawls]. "42 
The first thing to be noted about the pragmatic program Rorty ascribes to 
Rawls, as well as to Dewey-"putting politics first and tailoring a philosophy 
to suit"43-is that, if this is what the "priority" of the right to the good 
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amounts to, it is neither deontological nor teleological in any recognizable 
sense. Traditional talk of "rights" and "duties" no longer makes sense when 
severed from claims about human nature and rational motivation. But neither 
can Rorty's Rawls be construed as reversing the usual priority and putting 
the good first, if this is thought to provide epistemic warrant for moral truth 
claims. Since Rorty thinks that any extra-political justification of de facto 
social practices is self-deceptive, one cannot speak of "the good" as though 
this refers to something intrinsically valuable that we are obliged to maxi-
mize, including social cooperation. We may wish to put politics (in our case, 
democratic freedoms) first, but there is nothing to be right or wrong about 
here; there are only our more or less entrenched customs and those persons 
with whom we do or do not choose to identify.44 
It is instructive to compare Rorty's account of the political Rawls with his 
account of the "pragmatic side" of Thomas Jefferson. "This side," Rorty 
writes with typical aplomb, "says that when the individual finds in her con-
science beliefs which are relevant to public policy but incapable of defense 
on the basis of beliefs common to her fellow-citizens she must sacrifice her 
conscience on the altar of public expediency. "45 Rorty leaves no doubt that 
he thinks that Rawls's mature opinions would lead him to endorse a similar 
conclusion. The only difference is that whereas Jefferson could mitigate the 
shock of such a conclusion by appealing to the Enlightenment idea of "rea-
son" and its guarantee that truth will ultimately be justifiable to humanity at 
large, Rawls does not and could not make such an appeal. The understanding 
of reason as discloser of universal moral truths is no longer tenable, according 
to Rorty, so there can be no assurance that private truth will coincide with 
public justifiability. In other words, Rawls can find no solace in the 
Enlightenment's foundationalist epistemology. 
Observe, however, that the "sacrifice" Rorty refers to is also mitigated in 
Rawls's case. Jefferson could accept the hypothetical proposition, "If pri-
vately held truths cannot be justified publicly, then personal conscience must 
be submerged for the public good," because he was confident that the protasis 
would never in fact be satisfied. Rorty's Rawls, on the other hand, can em-
brace the same proposition because he does not see the apodosis as entailing 
any real loss. Since conscience is not thought of as the revealer of metaphys-
ical truths-much less as the core of the self and the locus of its rights and 
dignity-to "sacrifice" it is no big deal. There is no violation of personal 
integrity because there is no such integrity to be violated. "Where there is no 
honour there is no grief. "46 
Rawls takes Jefferson's "avoidance" of theology a step further, in Rorty's 
estimation, by sidestepping to boot standard philosophical concerns (e.g., 
with the dictates of conscience). But if we attribute to Rawls the full measure 
of Rortian pragmatism, he is even more radically minimalist than the word 
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"avoidance" might suggest. Rorty writes that "presumably, [Rawls] want$: .. 
questions about the point of human existence, or the rrieaning of humal'i1!"iife, . 
to be reserved for private life. "47 In fact, however, a R9i\ian does hot merely 
bracket anthropological and ethical theses for purpose; of politi(Jial discourse 
but rather dismisses them as unintelligible (or at least irrel~vant) as such. 
What is not publicly intelligible is not privately intelligibl~ either. Any and 
all metaphysical truth claims are dispensable, across the boatd, because truth, . 
goodness, humanity, etc. are opaque ideas we are better off without The; . 
unexamined life is worth living. Or, better, the examined life iSijot worth 
examining, neither for individuals nor for groups, at least Dot in PlIi16sophical 
terms. This means that, for Rorty and for Rawls (if mad~in RorfY's imlige), 
any entrenched political arrangement-Nazism, communism, plu.tocr~£y, in 
addition to democracy-is "prior" to philosophy. Just as any habitual prfvate 
behavior-sadism, masochism, fetishism, in addition to kindness-is un-
touchable by ethics. Psychotherapeutic categories may be applicable, but the . 
question of justifiability simply drops out, on both levels. 
The obvious response to a Rortian is to resist the reductionism With regard 
to truth, justification, and anthropology and to accept only a very litnited ~ 
version of the public/private distinction. One need not conflate treating par-
ticular metaphysical questions as marginal to politics, given the latte?s ~im­
ited means and ends, and treating all such questions as unanswerable or 
unintelligible. (The former is compatible with liberalism-as-morally-basic, 
while the latter implies liberalism-as-morally-empty.) More to the point, al-
though many theological and philosophical debates are not directly re1at~d to 
the everyday business of governing society-if only because we must take 
some things for granted-the acceptance as true of certain basic propositions 
about human nature and community appear to be e.ssential to a healthy de-
mocracy. Without them, it seems impossible not todivinize(our) society and 
thereby lose whatever critical purchase we may now have on ourselves and 
our social practices. Attention to others' real wants, needs, hopes, and fears 
is surely at the heart of moral motivation, even in the public domain. 
The danger of divinizing society even while claim~ngto disenchant the 
world is latent in Rorty's claim that, "if we want to flesh out our self-image," 
then "communitarians like [Charles] Taylor are right in saying that a concep-
tion of the self which makes the community constitutive of the self d~es 
comport well with liberal democracy."48 It makes all the difference how one' 
unpacks the word "constitutive," but Rorty'~ ptreme minimaIism leaves him 
with precious few resources to qualify the priority of c~mmunity so as to 
allow criticism of its constitution. Any nOrmative account of sha~.ed human 
j ,.'{ 
nature is out, it seems; but, more importantly, Rorty is u~il1ing_r unable 
to draw a sharp distinction between the causaland epistemqlogical pri()rity . 
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macy, on the other. There is no denying that each of us is deeply conditioned 
by being born into a web of interpersonal relations and cultural institutions 
not of our own making. The community precedes the individual not just 
chronologically, and individual dependency is part of what it means to be 
finite. Yet what is the larger import of these facts? 
Christian anthropology seems wedded to two basic theses: (1) that the 
social etiology of personal identity should not be confused with the ethical 
priority of groups over individuals, and (2) that the dependence of our epi-
stemic skills on culturally mediated artifacts (especially language) does not 
dictate letting go of truth, much less equating it with our conventions. With 
respect to 0), Rorty's radicalization of Hegel makes it nearly impossible for 
him to preserve what is common to both Christianity and Kantianism, namely, 
respect for the individual. Rorty's central political thesis is that democracy 
cannot have, but in any event does not need, metaphysical underpinnings. 
Neither principled love of all neighbors as made in the Image of God nor 
respect for all persons as ends-in-themselves grounds social solidarity. But 
is solidarity without any reason moral solidarity; and even if it is, is it likely 
to remain solidarity with all individuals, as opposed to with our particular 
tribe? We can thank Hegel for helping bring to consciousness the contingen-
cies of human existence, but how do we repudiate his idolatrous attitude 
toward the state as the closest thing to (divine) necessity in our lives? Can 
Rorty (or Rawls) sustain such a repudiation, intellectually? Do they even want 
to? With respect to thesis (2), Rorty's notorious identification of truth with 
"what our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying" has lately 
been displaced by a desire more or less to drop the idea of truth altogether.49 
But isn't either move deadly for self-criticism and thus for an acceptable 
theory of justice? 
At their best, liberals like Rawls and Rorty speak in a pastoral voice: 
undogmatic, taking us where we are, believing in us, and helping us to grope 
as a society toward self-understanding. This is an impressive achievement. 
My worry remains, however, that their technique is entirely too minimalist, 
too nondirective. The analogy of original-position-as-asylum helps us see that 
Rorty's Rawls, at any rate, offers the political philosopher's equivalent of 
Rogerian psychotherapy. His appeal to reflective equilibrium and overlapping 
consensus is a strategy of echo and adjustment in which normative questions 
cannot even be asked. Free association in the political sense looks very like 
free association in the Freudian sense. It is tempting to think of Rorty and 
Rawls as playing, respectively, the "rich aesthete" and "therapist" roles which 
Alasdair MacIntyre finds (along with "the manager") so dominant in liberal 
society; but that would be unfair to their better aspirations. I have already 
noted that Rawls considers his political conception of justice a moral con-
ception, and I shall return to this point below. For his part, Rorty contends 
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that "we should not assume that the aesthetic is always the enemy of the 
moral" and that the "l1ght-mindedness" he recommends serves "moral pur-
poses" by helping make people more tolerant and playfu1.50 I have rejected 
Rawls sand Rorty s judgments not because I hold the therapeutic or the 
aesthetic always to be at odds with ethics, but because I do not believe that 
they can SUBSTITUTE for ethics. Instead of a reduction or elimination of ethics 
for political purposes, what is wanted is an expansion and refinement: a broad 
moral and metaphysical context in which to locate liberalism as a limited 
theory of statecraft, a context that Rortian pragmatism cannot provide.51 
Although Rorty, unlike Beckley, sees the radical historicism entailed by 
many of Rawls's articles published after A Theory of Justice, what Rorty 
celebrates in this political Rawls, I lament as incompatible with Christian 
faith as well as civic virtue. If Rawlsian justice were to make impossible the 
relativization of de facto political and economic conventions, as Rorty's most 
extensive interpretation seems to imply, then MacIntyre's "Dark Ages" would 
be upon us, whether they took the form of state socialism or democratic 
capitalism or something remote from either. The last thing to be said about 
Rorty's "Priority" comments on Rawls, however, is that they cannot be the 
final word. Rawls has not returned to the priory, but neither has he remained 
camped in postmodern Bedlam. He has continued to write, and his coordi-
nates have continued to shift. 
III. Part Way Back: Justice As Both Political and Metaphysical? 
In two still more recent essays, Rawls attempts to respond to the charge of 
moral vacuity and related criticisms. "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus" 
(1987) and "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good" (1988) defend the 
same thesis: justice as fairness is a moral conception affirmed on moral 
grounds, not a mere convergence of self- or group-interests. 52 An overlapping 
consensus about the basic structures of society is not a modus vivendi, Rawls 
contends in both places; and he goes on in the 1987 work to offer the follow-
ing reassuring (and unRortian) comments on truth: 
[j]ustification in matters of political justice is addressed to others who dis-
agree with us, and therefore it proceeds from some consensus: from premises 
that we and others recognize as true or as reasonable for the purpose of 
reaching a working agreement on the fundamentals of political justice.53 
it would be fatal to the point of a political conception [of justice] to see it as 
sceptical about, or indifferent to, truth, much less as in conflict with it. Such 
scepticism or indifference would put political philosophy in conflict with 
numerous comprehensive doctrines [of the good], and thus defeat from the 
outset its aim of achieving an overlapping consensus. In following the method 
of avoidance, as we may call it, we try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor 
deny any religious, philosophical or moral views, or their associated philo-
sophical accounts of truth and the status of values. 54 
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It is hard not to read these remarks as a recantation of the constructivism of 
"Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical." Rawls is not yet the strong 
pragmatist (a.k.a. "strong poet") Rorty makes him out to be. He sounds 
especially metaphysical in the 1988 essay, referring to the "essential nature" 
of citizens, to political society as an "intrinsic good," and to seeking "com-
mon ground" between various religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.55 
In emphasizing that it is comprehensive doctrines that he is ruling out in the 
original position, he acknowledges that what might be called elemental views 
do in fact play a part. What we are given in the two recent pieces is still 
somewhat ambivalent as between the "l-a-m-b" and the "l-a-m-e" versions 
of liberalism, however. Rawls grants that "the right and the good are com-
plementary"56 but nowhere draws the obvious inference that his conception 
of justice is both political and metaphysical, and with good reason. Such an 
inference would reintroduce the most problematic questions of truth pre-
viously sidestepped and radically deflate the implications of what Rawls calls 
"the fact of pluralism." 
Rawls continues to insist that our inability to arrive at agreement on a thick 
conception of the good life requires treating the right (i.e., his political con-
ception of justice) as having "priority." But there can be no priority if prin-
ciples of justice are grounded on claims, however basic, about human nature 
and political virtue. Indeed, if elemental anthropological and axiological 
truths are included as ingredients in reflective equilibrium, then the very idea 
of a (purely) political conception of justice becomes highly suspect. Rawls 
claims that political liberalism "consists in a conception of politics, not of 
the whole of life,"57 but this is either a truism or false. Of course, a pluralistic 
Catholic will not want to interject all the vagaries of soteriology, Christology, 
Mariology, etc. into public discourse about who gets to vote. But such obvious 
cases aside, politics and the good life will be so inextricably linked for such 
an individual that suggesting an either/or between them is absurd. Rawls 
himself writes that "a political conception must draw upon various ideas of 
the good," adding that "[t]he question is: subject to what restriction. "58 But 
the point is that if the restriction must itself be motivated by (or at least be 
compatible with) comprehensive moral commitments, then talk of "priority" 
is misplaced and talk of "neutrality" is highly misleading. 
If, in contrast, the restriction stems from a narrowly political concern (so-
cial cooperation divorced from all metaphysical truth claims), then my earlier 
objections remain undiminished. If, for instance, people are "regarded"59 (Le., 
merely regarded) as free, equal, and possessed of moral powers because this 
facilitates our overriding interest in getting along, then we are back with 
Hobbes. In this case, practice trumps rather than completes theory, and justice 
is indeed political only. Rather than "each comprehensive doctrine, from 
within its own view, [being] led to accept the public reasons of justice spec-
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ified by justice as fairness," as claimed by Rawls in 1985,60 a comprehensive 
doctrine such as Christianity would have to reject Rawls. 
From the "constructivist" notion that justice as fairness is not embraced on 
the basis of any substantive truth claim about the way the world is, two things 
would follow. Both are at odds with Rawls's cherished ideals, but unavoidable 
given his 1985 premises. First, there is no way, in principle, to guard against 
the exigency that social cooperation may someday be advanced by treating 
certain people as unfree and unequal-it may even be that the latter welcome 
their inferior status and would rebel against equal regard (as, perhaps, would 
the lower castes in India). Second, no morally realistic religion or philosophy 
can embrace Rawlsian justice and remain internally consistent. For moral 
realists, "truth" and "falsity" are as inseparable from public moral discourse 
as "right" and "wrong," "good" and "evil." This holds even if truth, rightness, 
and goodness are deemed too complex to be captured within the bounds of 
traditional theoria. 
Hence the question of this section reduces to how to interpret Rawls's more 
recent essays (post-1985) and whether they are normative. In the opening 
paragraph of "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," he observes that 
"[w]hat is needed is a regulative political conception of justice that can 
articulate and order in a principled way the political ideals and values of a 
democratic regime .... "61 I can sum up my misgivings by saying that I do not 
think that Rawls's characterization of justice as a "regulative" ideal succeeds 
any better than Kant's similar characterization of God, and for parallel rea-
sons. 
Kant wanted to "deny [dogmatic] knowledge in order to make room for 
faith," while Rawls wants to deny comprehensive faith in order to make room 
for fairness. Both men offer breathtakingly subtle architectonics but end up 
bifurcating theoretical and practical reason. Rawlsian political "truths" (the 
freedom and equality of persons) are as ambiguous as Kantian practical 
"postulates" (God, freedom, and immortality). To put it yet another way, 
Rawls stands in roughly the same (unintentionally deconstructive) relation to 
classical liberalism as Kant did to classical theism: justice within the limits 
of Rawlsian politics alone is no more recognizable to a traditional democrat 
than religion within the limits of Kantian reason alone was recognizable to 
a traditional believer. And even as Nineteenth Century critics of theism found 
ample ammunition in Kant for pronouncing God dead, so Twenty-first Cen-
tury foes of liberalism will find resources in Rawls for declaring democracy 
decadent. Neither God nor a finite person can survive as a mere focus im-
aginarius. 
Conclusion 
When Christians attempt to speak about justice to a pluralistic, increasingly 
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secular culture-such as the Twentieth Century United States-they may 
experience alienation at not being understood, much less heeded. In the face 
of this, it is tempting to search for a lingua franca with which to address the 
age. It is tempting to try to translate Christian accounts of justice (e.g., Jesus's 
parables or Saint Paul's discussion of dikaiosune) into "neutral" terms, to 
transform the Vorstellungen of faith into a Begriff of secular philosophy. 
Rawls's "theory" of justice is often thought to be congenial to such purposes. 
In light of the problems discussed above, however, I do not believe that 
Christian ethicists ought to baptize his account of "justice as fairness." 
Rawls's reliance on overlapping consensus concerning the freedom and 
equality of persons is problematic for three reasons. First, if personal freedom 
and equality are construed as "models" without truth value and for which no 
justification can or need be given in our society, then they are no longer 
conclusions of dialectical argument but rather premises of descriptive soci-
ology. This is the side of Rawls that Richard Rorty applauds, but it cuts 
against viewing A Theory of Justice and other works as exercises in moral 
reasoning and renders a Christian "affirmation" (like that of Beckley) out of 
the question. Second, if "freedom and equality" are defined substantively, 
then Rawls's view of persons is not in fact widely shared in contemporary 
American society. This is the point made by Michael Sandel, Michael Perry, 
and others. Yet, thirdly, if freedom and equality are defined broadly enough 
to be uncontroversial, they can do little work in political theory and are not 
even candidates for affirmation or denia1.62 
This does not mean that Christians should give up on liberal society in 
favor of theocracy, any more than they should give up on justified (or other-
wise entitled) true belief in favor of mere prejudice. As Yoder and Hauerwas 
have reminded us, Christianity is not a handmaiden to any political philoso-
phy; and as Plantinga and Wolterstorff have shown, the rejection of 
foundationalist epistemology need not leave us without rational beliefs and 
truthful traditions.63 If we would have democratic, egalitarian institutions 
succeed (as I would), we must first have committed our characters to some-
thing higher than self-interest, or even social cooperation. And before we can 
speak about justice to the world, we must embody it as the truth of our life 
in God. The later Rawls at times finds any anthropological claim deemed true 
too controversial to be included in the justifying reasons for liberalism. In 
contrast, moral realists like myself believe the basic liberal truths, un-
dergirded by the best of religious and secular thought, to be universally 
available precisely because they are true. 
Without appeal to moral truth and recognition of the codependence of the 
good and the right, Rawlsian maximization of freedom and equality has a 
highly ambiguous status-paradoxically seeming, in Harvey Mansfield's 
words, "the criterion of democrats who want no criterion."64 Moreover, with-
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out commitment to moral truth (as opposed to social cooperation) as primary 
motive, it is unlikely.even that just action will be possible. And lastly, without 
commitment to moral truth-however fallibly worked out and narratively, 
rather than deductively, formulated-it is impossible to do justice to Christian 
emphases on the person of Christ as the Truth Incarnate. If Rawls's script 
requires Christians to surrender love as the touchstone of political decision-
making, then he is not extending to them the kind of respect that he seeks to 
exact from them. In a word, he is being tyrannical. 
Christians need not demand that others accept a particular political arrange-
ment out of love, but they themselves must do so or they have violated their 
own integrity. The issue is one of ethics, not merely psychology: while it may 
sometimes be permissible to submit to a cognitive impoverishment and act 
on the basis of less information than one could in fact command, it is never 
right to submit to a moral impoverishment and act with less virtue. It is never 
proper to surrender love, even if it were possible to do this out of love 
itself-an axiom that might be called "the priority of agape to political 
philosophy." It is impossible, therefore, for Christians to found distributive 
justice on personal prudence, social cooperation, and/or the thin sense of the 
good allowed by the political Rawls in the original position. These are blue-
prints for the secular Bedlam, even if motivated by the noble desire to secure 
public peace. 
In referring to Rawls's course as "to Bedlam and part way back," I do not 
mean to suggest that he is insane. He does sometimes speak, nevertheless, as 
though he is in charge ofa ward of madmen who have forgotten they are in 
a hospital, much less in an erstwhile priory. He uses veils rather than straight-
jackets to constrain their more self-absorbed tendencies, but he does not 
question the bedlam that makes the veils necessary or of which the veils 
themselves are indicators. On the contrary, he suggests that those disinclined 
to take the secular veil are the mad ones. Commenting on Loyola's belief 
"that the dominant end is serving God, and by this means saving our soul" 
and Aquinas's belief "that the vision of God is the last end of all human 
knowledge and endeavor," Rawls writes: "Although to subordinate all our 
aims to one end does not strictly speaking violate the principle of rational 
choice .. .it still strikes us as irrational, or more likely as mad. "65 For Chris-
tians, coming all the way back from Bedlam (as madhouse) would mean 
returning to Bedlam (as Bethlehem): acknowledging the situatedness of our-
selves and our communities before the God who became incarnate in Christ. 
This would by no means require imposing religious convictions or theocratic 
institutions on others, but it would mean admitting the inseparability of meta-
physical claims about who we think we are and political claims about how 
we ought to live together. 
The best we can hope for in a Western society is a doctrinal convergence 
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supported by distinctive pictures of the good. Granting this apparently harsh 
reality is preferable to pursuing the impossibly neutral ideal of the political 
Rawls's "theory" of justice. Yet, again, the best alternative to a morally empty 
liberalism is not religious totalitarianism, any more than the best alternative 
to nondirective counseling is shock therapy or brainwashing. A tolerant, plu-
ralistic society is itself a substantive good-not something to be accepted as 
the result of moral breakdown but worthy of promotion/or its own sake. The 
plenitude of the world is bound to call up diverse forms of life, some equally 
virtuous; and assisting individuals and groups to pursue virtue freely is part 
of what it means to treat them as neighbors.66 The trick is to be rabbinic 
enough to be transformative without being cruel, ironic enough to admit 
fallibility without becoming nihilistic or sectarian. But for Christians to sus-
pend scriptural truth claims for the sake of a universalizable "theory" of 
justice would be (in Paul Ramsey's words) to exchange their birthright for a 
"pot of message. "67 It would be to migrate from Judea's Bethlehem to 
London's Bedlam: not a pilgrimage but a defection. 
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